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November 2010 
 
Abstract: 
 
The corporate governance issue in Macedonian companies has been brought forward during the 
recent few years. The main reason is the fact that the privatization process completion of 
socially-owned and partly state-owned enterprises has put emphasis to the challenge to 
reasonably regulate relationships established within companies on one hand, and relationships 
between companies and larger society on the other. All market economies, including those with 
longest tradition, have faced this kind of challenge so far. 
 
Corporate governance becomes an increasingly important issue for the Macedonian economy. It 
is being taken with greater consideration by the companies, regulators and government. The 
strong wave of privatization programs from mid-90’ have resulted in an altered business 
environment, and new legal and institutional frameworks have been established. Indeed, 
corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by enhancing the 
performance of companies and increasing their access to external sources of capital. 
 
In this paper we will make attempt to analyze the predominant factors that create prolific 
corporate governance environment in two terms; a) micro level and macro level.  
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Introduction  
 
This paper is concerned with corporate governance and enterprise restructuring through a 
measure of management’s capabilities to act in the best interest of shareholders, as well as, the 
mechanisms that trigger managerial behavior needed to augment the wealth of the enterprise i.e. 
the stewardship and enterprise dimensions. The specific characteristics of the economies in 
transition give research ground for different models analyzing the effects of governance and 
organizational capabilities for restructuring. The economy of Macedonia has been characterized 
by high level of changes in the ownership structure and business environment turbulence. There 
are studies that specifically analyze the changes in the ownership structure and business 
environment turbulence, which will be used in this article (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 
2000; Uhlenbruck & Castro, 1998).   
 
The already established transition economic theory gives evidence that the privatization of 
formerly state-owned companies is not fallowed with performance improvements as default 
guarantee (Megginson & Netter, 2001). Further, the literature suggests that it is needed 
replacement of the management and introduction of several governance mechanisms, if wanted 
grater performance of newly privatized enterprises (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000).  Indeed, the 
studies analyzing governance and enterprise restructuring in transition economies suggest that 
evolving corporate governance is crucial for the outcome of firm restructuring (Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002; Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 2000). Thus, it is evident that different methods of 
privatization (management-employee buyouts, gave-aways, tying to strategic foreign investors, 
etc.) require different governance. 
 
Due to the nature of the transition process these markets have different settings and attributes 
when compared to developed national economies (Hoskisson, Johnson, Yiu, & Wan, 2006). The 
learning process of the corporate governance in post-communist economies is characterized by 
the need of developing the monitoring systems, as well as, tuning managers to respect and satisfy 
the needs of the shareholders (Filatotchev, Hoskisson, Buck, & Wright, 1996), which is creating 
new ‘rules of the game’(North, 1990; North, 1994). Hence, the weight of transformation and 
enterprise restructuring falls on the quality of managers and their capabilities to learn the new 
rules of the game (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Steensma & Lyles, 2000).    
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The research hypotheses are: 
 
1st Hypothesis i.e. Micro Level: domestic versus foreign owners, companies are driven by 
foreign owners; 
2nd Hypothesis i.e. Macro Level: governance and enterprise restructuring is influenced by gross 
domestic product and foreign direct investments dynamics. 
 
Theoretical and literature framework  
 
1. The transition economy literature 
 
The planned economies’ management based on the principles of theoretical ground of the 
political ideology at that time when national economies were characterized by state-owned 
property inducing acute inefficiencies of firms, thus also on overall macro level (Kornai, 1992). 
This resulted with incapability to increase efficiency of the firms and make their products 
competitive in regional and international business environment (Sachs, Warner, Åslund, & 
Fischer, 1995). The process of privatization was imposed as to introduce sociopolitical change 
and improve macroeconomic benefits, as well as, ‘restart’ the state-owned companies by 
imposing market managerial mechanisms (Megginson & Netter, 2001) . 
 
There has been variation of different modes of privatization that were imposed while 
restructuring from planned to functional market economies, and there is sufficient literature 
bases that suggest different mode of privatization lead to different governance outcomes (EBRD, 
1994-2009; Estrin & Wright, 1999; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2000)  
 
 
2. Problems of governance in transition economies 
 
There are studies that link enterprise restructuring with governance features, such as board 
attributes and ownership structure (for example, (Bergh, 1995; Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; 
Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). The specificities of each separate 
country contribute to explanations of enterprise restructuring, such as development of market 
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institutions, government involvement, ownership patterns, industry structures and enforcement of 
business laws (Chang & Hong, 2000; La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; 
North, 1994). During the restructuring phase important hybrid organizational forms took place 
i.e. so-called ’recombinant properties’, which represent recombination of property, thus 
distorting the boundary between public and private ownership (Peng & Heath, 1996; Spicer, 
McDermott, & Kogut, 2000; Stark, 1996). The variations in enterprise restructuring outcomes 
could be caused by managerial opportunisms which are not controlled by the owners; hence this 
is likely to be a consequence of board composition, legal enforcement (the lack of it) and weak 
capital market (Filatotchev et al., 2000; Wright, Buck, & Filatotchev ). Thus, the governance 
problems most often are caused by inadequate monitoring of managers or because they have 
acquired too much ownership due bending the transition process (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny; 
Newman, 2000; Whitley & Czaban, 1998) .  
 
3. Apprenticing and competences 
 
One of the most important problems that transition economies are faced with is the lack of 
capital and new ways of acquiring finances, moreover because the capital markets are not well 
developed and there is no sufficient protection to foreign and minority investors (EBRD, 1994-
2009). Consequently, the enterprise restructuring in all its organizational characteristics turns 
around learning and fortification of market competencies (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Uhlenbruck, 
Meyer, & Hitt, 2003). 
 
The ‘ability to change’ as a function of ﬁrm’s resources is essential to enterprise restructuring 
(Barker Iii & Duhaime, 1997), especially in an environment where they have very limited 
absorptive capacity i.e. the ability ‘to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and 
apply it to commercial ends’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This is quite vital as it provides firms 
with strategic flexibility to assume good positions in constantly changing and turbulent transition 
environment (Puffer, McCarthy, & Peterson, 2001). 
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Indeed, the absorptive capacity and the ability to adopt and further build competitive capacities 
depends on prior knowledge, which in transition economies is estimated to be significantly low 
(Newman, 2000) 
 
4. Governance and upgrade of competences  
 
 
The constrains that inflict enterprise restructuring are usually lack of effective governance 
mechanisms, as well as, managerial inability to adopt to changes (Mahoney, 1995). However, it 
is evident that managerial abilities may get better due time, but these improvements are usually 
lagging behind the pace of change in the business environment. Thus, effective corporate 
governance can influence managers to improve and increase the overall strategic flexibility of 
the firm towards undertaking the necessary restructuring (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2009; 
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Johnson, 1996). 
 
In the  analytical framework used by Filatotchev, Wright, Hoskisson et al. there are two basic 
dimensions of governance modes: insider and outsider governance modes  (Filatotchev, Wright, 
Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003).  
 
The insider governance mode is characterized by governance mechanisms imposed by dominant 
ownership management and employees and outsider governance mode is associated to 
dominance of ownership from investors outside of the firm (mainly foreign investors)(Hitt et al., 
2009; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Puffer et al., 2001). The other two dimensions are low or high 
absorptive capacity that indicate the capability of the firm to upgrade its competences due time 
and competitive pressures (Filatotchev et al., 2003) :  
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Figure I.1 Corporate governance and learning capacity 
                                 Insider governance Outsider governance 
Learning—low 
absorptive capacity 
Quadrant 1: Stuck privatization  
 
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Managerial incentives 
reduced in absence of 
purchase 
 Low managerial turnover  
 Resistance to outside board 
members  
 Entrenchment of traditional 
networks  
 Low learning and weak 
governance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of low corporate 
restructuring effectiveness 
Quadrant 2: Privatization to 
domestic institutions 
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Managerial incentives but 
poor wealth diversification 
lead to low risk behavior 
 Monitoring by outside 
investors 
 Limited access to outside 
networks 
 Important role of bank-led 
financial-industrial groups 
producing financial 
reallocation but also 
private appropriation 
 Ambiguous efficiency of 
governance, may be traded 
off for low learning 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of moderate 
corporate restructuring 
effectiveness 
Learning—high 
absorptive capacity 
Quadrant 3: Privatization buy-
outs  
 
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Managerial incentives  
 Passive monitoring by 
financiers  
 Limited access to outside 
networks  
 High learning is traded off 
for weak governance 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of moderate 
corporate restructuring 
effectiveness 
Quadrant 4: Privatization to 
foreign investors 
 
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Effective boards 
 Managerial turnover 
 Break-out from traditional 
networks 
 High learning 
complements high 
efficiency governance 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of high 
corporate restructuring 
effectiveness 
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Analytical Framework 
 
1. Sample selection and Data 
 
The first assumption will be analyzed on the bases of a survey on shareholders in Macedonia, 
with an emphasis on their rights (the level of acknowledgement of their rights, the level and 
manner of practicing of their rights, their involvement in the company’s decision making), 
conducted by USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA)1 .  
 
Since there has been a major development of the capital market in Macedonia, increase of the 
knowledge of investors and the broader public, this survey is a more comprehensive research and 
provides a more general picture of the shareholders’ structure, with an emphasis on (the level of) 
incorporation of good Corporate Governance practices in the companies, especially the Joint 
Stock Companies. The principal players are the shareholders, management and the board of 
directors. 
 
The second estimation is based on data provided by the data bases of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition report series (EBRD, 1994-2009), the 
World Bank Database2 and the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia3 and Macedonian 
Stock Exchange4. The indicator of GDP is measuring growth in real GDP (in per cent) for the 
time period of 1989 to 2009 (with exceptions for the years where data was not available, which is 
minor) and the indicator of FDI’s is measuring foreign direct investment as net inflows recorded 
in the balance of payments.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA). Available at :[ http://www.bea.org.mk/ ] 
2 World Bank Database, Available at: [ http://data.worldbank.org/ ] 
3 National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. Available at:  [ http://www.nbrm.gov.mk/ ] 
4
 Macedonian Stock Exchange. Available at:  [ http://www.mse.org.mk/ ] 
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2. Model and Econometrics  
 
a) First hypothesis analytical framework 
 
The first hypothesis is that companies are driven by foreign owners which puts domestic versus 
foreign owners, and it is tightly connected with the second hypothesis. In order to get good 
results and more complete research, this first hypothesis is analyzed qualitatively. Thus, the 
approach taken is concerned with the micro level of Macedonian economy i.e. examination on 
the origin of dominant owners and the impact each category has to directing the firm structure 
therefore giving favorable outcomes. 
b) Second hypothesis analytical framework 
 
The econometric model (Freedman, 2005) that is used for the second hypothesis is a regression 
model where we have estimated the fallowing equation: 
 
ipipio xxi   ...11    (1)   
 
ni ,...1    (2) 
Thus, applied to our research this model has the fallowing shape: 
 
tititioti FDIGDPGOV ,,2,1,   (4) 
 where the dependent variable, 
tiGOV , , shows governance and enterprise restructuring;  
 the independent variables, are as follows :  
1. 
tiGDP ,  gross domestic product;  
2. 
tiFDI ,  foreign direct investments;  
   is a p-dimensional parameter vector ;  
  is the error term or noise. 
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Results and Effects 
1. Results on the first hypothesis i.e. Micro Level 
 
The numbers taken from the IFC’s Corporate Governance Manual for Macedonian companies 
and the survey of USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA)5  are valid until 2008 and were 
retrieved from the Central Depositary6. The number of Joint Stock Companies at that time was 
577, with total number of shareholders 174 870. Thus, largest type of holders is the domestic 
individuals (95.64%), followed by domestic legal entities (2.43%). The foreign individuals form 
a group of 1.43% and the smallest is the group of foreign legal entities with 0.45% of shares in 
the Macedonian joint stock companies (IFC, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, if we observe the number of shares that are owned by various types of owners 
we get completely different picture, which confirms the first hypothesis in this study. Hence, 
more than half (56.68%) of the shares in the Macedonian joint stock companies are owned by the 
foreign legal entities. This group is followed by domestic legal entities which own 34.23% of all 
shares in the country, and at the end there are domestic and foreign individual owners who hold 
in total less than 10% of the shares in the Macedonian joint stock companies (IFC, 2008).   
 
These values are well portrayed in the figures below, where it is found evidence for the first 
hypothesis i.e. most of the valuable and important Macedonian joint stock companies, that in 
essence form the Macedonian economy, are indeed driven by foreign owners. 
 
The fact that more than half of the shares in the Macedonian joint stock companies are owned by 
foreign legal entities is connected to the movements in foreign direct investment and thus to the 
second hypothesis. Furthermore, it is evidence of dispersion of shareholding by domestic owners 
against concentration of control of foreign entities. This also shows that most of the enterprise 
restructuring, learning and apprenticing of new capacities and capabilities, hence improving 
corporate governance and governance of the economy in general, comes from foreign input. 
 
                                               
5 USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA). Available at :[ http://www.bea.org.mk/ ] 
6 Central Depositary [http://www.cdhv.org.mk/] 
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Figure I.2 Percentage of shares by type of holder 
 
Figure I.3 Percentage of the number of shares by type of holder 
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2. Results on the second hypothesis i.e. Macro Level  
 
The results on the second hypothesis are shown in the tables below. The second hypothesis 
assumes that governance and enterprise restructuring is influenced by gross domestic product 
and foreign direct investments dynamics. Further, the study produced correlation matrix and 
OLS regression analysis results. 
 
Figure I.4 Correlation Matrix on GOV for GDP and FDI – Macedonia 
GOV GDP FDI
GOV 1
GDP 0.8327 1
FDI 0.6936 0.4835 1
 
 
 
Figure I.5 OLS on GOV for GDP and FDI – Macedonia   
OLS
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
Independent 
Variable  Macedonia
GDP 0.0741883
[0.0140246]***
FDI 0.0010187
[0.0003291]***
Constant 1.859174
[0.0845265]***
Observations 63
R-squared 0.8039
Adjusted R-
squared 0.7808
Time period 1989-2009
Significance Level: *** p < 0.01   ** p < 0.05   * p < 0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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The OLS analysis is rather basic and it has the purpose to indicate and support the first 
hypothesis. The results of the OLS regression explaining the link between GOV and GDP, FDI 
are given in the figures describe the relationships and movements between these variables.  
 
The GDP results are significant for both GDP and FDI (p < 0.01). It is clear from the figures that 
governance and enterprise restructuring is positively influenced by gross domestic product and 
especially foreign direct investments dynamics. 
 
However, it must be said that deeper econometric analysis might bring different light to the way 
separate segments of these variables contribute to governance and enterprise restructuring. 
Hence, the business aspect of analysis introduced to this paper gives rather satisfactory picture of 
the positive impact that foreign investments give to the business environment, as well as, their 
dominance in ownership shareholding which eventually impacts the process of learning, 
capabilities building and apprenticing from foreign boards and investors.  
 
14 
 
Figure I.6 GDP in GOV – Macedonia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.7 FDI in GOV – Macedonia  
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Discussion 
  
 
The first analysis gave results that more than half of the shares in the Macedonian joint stock 
companies are controlled by the foreign legal entities. The analysis of the second hypothesis 
showed to be significant for foreign direct investments. Hence, it can be said that the ownership 
structure is connected to the movements in foreign direct investment and thus to the second 
hypothesis. This also confirms the premise that domestic ownership is dispersed and the control 
is given to foreign entities, where the influx of new capacities and capabilities pushed by foreign 
ownership increases the learning and apprenticing process of the firm. 
 
The basic examination of foreign direct investment variable, gross domestic product variable and 
governance and enterprise restructuring variable indicates that governance and enterprise 
restructuring is positively influenced by gross domestic product and especially foreign direct 
investments dynamics. 
 
The format of study and the business aspect of the research give acceptable results of the impact 
that foreign investment to the business environment, as well as, the dominance of ownership 
shareholding which eventually impacts the process of learning, capabilities building and 
apprenticing from foreign boards and investors.  
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